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Abstract : This work introduces a new concept of “Chinese Magic Box”. The general idea is to 
have a box such that the sender can store information in multiple drawers. The receiver is free to 
open any drawer. However, once the receiver opens the drawer – he can retrieve the information 
from that drawer only, that is, the information that was stored in the other drawers is lost. This 
property is achieved by storing the information using a set of non-orthogonal quantum states. The 
different “drawers” are realized by different orthogonal set of basis for the measurement. Once the 
measurement is performed, the information in this basis is retrieved. At the same time, due to wave 
function collapse the information in the other basis is lost and cannot be retrieved. I show how to 
construct a set of states for a single qubit to implement a “Box” with two or three “drawers”. Some 
applications are discussed. Among them is a new non-symmetric Quantum Key Distribution with 
only single direction classical communication. 
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1  Background      
 
The seminal paper on the use of quantum states for secure communication by S. Wiesner 
sparked a flow of research in this field. In that paper [1] Wiesner introduced the concept 
of storing information using conjugate coding – i.e. the information is stored in one out of 
two complementing set of states. One can retrieve the information only by reading from 
the correct channel. If the incorrect channel is used then the information can not be read 
and is lost. It was soon realized that this idea could be used for secure key distribution by 
the BB84 [2] protocol. 
The main properties that are being used are the no-cloning [5] theorem together with the 
fact that the qubit is characterized by two complex numbers rather than a single number 
that specify the probability to find the bit in a state of "0" or "1". Thus, the qubit can be 
prepared in many different basis. The classical "bit" can be coded by a qubit either in the 
computational basis {|0>,|1>} or in the {|+>, |->} basis at the will of the preparer. The 
receiver of the qubit, can uncover the bit only if she knows (or can correctly guess) at 
which basis the bit was encoded. If the reader is guessing incorrectly – the result is zero 
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information, that is – it has zero correlation with the stored information. In such a case, in 
addition to the zero correlation with the stored information - the stored information is 
destroyed due to wave function collapse. The no-cloning theorem ensures that the 
receiver cannot make two choices for the same qubit, unlike classical mechanics – where 
the reader is able to poke the systems as many time as she wishes with negligible effect 
on the system. 
This phenomenon was then used by Bennet and Brassard (the BB84 protocol) to yield a 
Quantum Cryptographic protocol [2]. In that protocol - Alice (the sender) is generating a 
random code, part of which will be used as a cryptographic code. She then encodes the 
message randomly either in the computation basis (|0>,|1>) or the {|+>, |->}, basis. Bob 
who is on the receiving end of the communication will now also choose randomly at which 
basis to read. Both Bob and Alice publically share their choices of basis. Once Bob and 
Alice know their respective choice of basis they can establish a common sequence of 
random bits. A crucial aspect of the protocol is that one can detect whether there is an 
eve-dropper - Eve -  in the loop.  
In addition to this protocol, later Ekert devised a protocol based on EPR pairs [3,4]. 
Instead of sending qubits from Alice to Bob, an entangled pair is created such that the 
qubit that Alice receives is correlated with that of Bob. Like before, both Alice and Bob 
make their measurement and if they agree on the basis, they can be sure that the 
sequence of bits that they both measured is common and can be used as a secret code. 
The no-cloning theorem protects also this code from being copied without both Alice’s 
and Bob’s awareness. There are also many practical implementation of the Quantum Key 
Distribution [6-8]. 
In next section, I will first describe how a sender can store two different bits in a single 
qubit. The caveat being that only one of the bits can be retrieved (with some error 
probability), once the bit is retrieved – the other bit cannot be retrieved. Which channel is 
retrieved and which is destroyed is given to the choice of the reader. 
I will than show how similar result can be achieved with three bits and a single qubit. 
In section 3, I will provide possible applications and in particular a one-directional classical 
communication for quantum key distribution. 
Section 4 will summarize the work and provide issues for further research. 
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2 Multi—Compartment Qubit 
 
In this section I will show how to build magic boxes with two or three “drawers” using 
single qubit. 
2.1 Two Drawers Box 
 
Let us define the states Ψα,β 
 Ψ0,0 = a|0 > +b|1 >  
 Ψ0,1 = a|0 > −b|1 > (1) 
 Ψ1,0 = b|0 > +a|1 >  
 Ψ1,1 = b|0 > −a|1 >  
 
 
Let set  a = cos (
π
8
)     b = sin (
π
8
) . 
Alice can store the two classical bits (α, β) in the same qubit by setting the state of the 
qubit to the appropriate Ψα,β state. 
Alice will send the qubit to Bob. 
Now if Bob wishes to retrieve the α bit – he will measure the qubit in the computational 
basis - {|0>, |1>}. It can be easily seen that the probability to get the correct result is :. 
 
|a|2 = cos2
π
8
=
1
2
+
√2
4
= 0.85355339059 
(2) 
 
If Bob wishes to retrieve the β bit he will measure the qubit in the {|+>, |->} basis.  
Where  
 
|+>=
1
√2
 {|0 > + |1 >} 
 
 
|−>=
1
√2
 {|0 > − |1 >} 
(3) 
 
If the result is |+> then Bob registers the value “0”, and if the result is |-> than Bob 
registers the value “1”. One can see that the probability to get the correct result is again  
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 |a|2 = cos2
π
8
= 0.85355339059 (4) 
 
After Bob’s retrieving the α bit - the β bit is lost, since after measuring in the computational 
basis - the qubit will be in an eigenstate of the computational basis with equal probability 
for results in the {|+>, |->} basis, and vice versa. 
The information content of the qubit is be calculated by noticing that each “drawer” can 
be considered as a simple binary channel with random noise. Using Shannon’s 
information theory [9] one gets that the information content of the α bit is: 
 I = 1 + p log2(p) + (1 − p) log2(1 − p) = 0.39912396329 (5) 
 
The same calculation applies for the β bit. Hence, the total amount of information carried 
by each qubit is 2*I  0.8. This value is clearly smaller than 1 but not significantly. At the 
same time, the information that can actually be retrieved from each qubit is only ~ 0.4 
bits. The choice of which “drawer” to retrieve is in the hands of the reader. Once the qubit 
has been read the information in the other drawer is lost. It is also clear that this process 
does not violate the Holevo bound [10]. 
Note: Given the above derivation one can show that the choice of value for a is optimal 
in the sense of minimal number of qubits sent from Alice to Bob assuming that the same 
amount of information is carried in the computational and the {|+>,|->} basis. 
2.2 Three Compartments Box 
 
Let us define the states Ψα,β,γ 
 
Ψ0,0,0 = a |0 > +e
iπ
4 b| 1 > 
 
 
Ψ0,0,1 = a |0 > −ie
iπ
4 b| 1 > 
 
 
Ψ0,1,0 = a |0 > +ie
iπ
4 b| 1 > 
 
 
Ψ0,1,1 = a |0 > −e
iπ
4 b| 1 > 
(6) 
 
Ψ1,0,0 = b |0 > +e
iπ
4 a| 1 > 
 
 
Ψ1,0,1 = b |0 > −ie
iπ
4 a| 1 > 
 
 
Ψ1,1,0 = b |0 > +ie
iπ
4 a| 1 > 
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Ψ1,1,1 = b |0 > −e
iπ
4 a| 1 > 
 
 
Let us now define the standard three basis of the qubit (corresponding to the three 
eigensvectors of the Pauli matrices): 
B1 =  {|0>, |1>)      B2 = {|+>, |->}    and B3 = {|u>, |d>}   where 
 
|+>=
1
√2
 {|0 > + |1 >} 
 
 
|−>=
1
√2
 {|0 > − |1 >} 
 
 
|u >=
1
√2
 {|0 > +i |1 >} 
(7) 
 
|d >=
1
√2
 {|0 > − i|1 >} 
 
Whenever Alice wishes to transfer a triplet of bits – (α, β, γ) to Bob, she will construct the 
state Ψα,β,γ and transfer it to Bob. Bob can choose which channel to retrieve. If he wishes 
to retrieve the α channel, he will measure in the basis B1 with obvious interpretation. If he 
wishes to retrieve the β channel, he will measure in the basis B2 , where |+> is interpreted 
as “0”, and |-> as “1”. If he wishes to retrieve the γ channel, he will measure in the basis 
B3, where |u> is interpreted as “0”, and |d> as “1”. In all cases Bob will retrieve the original 
bit with some error probability. 
One can calculate the probability of the results in all three bases – B1, B2 and B3. Table 1 
summarizes the results of measuring the above-defined states in any of the above-
mentioned bases. 
 B1 B2 B3 
Ψ0,0,0 Prob(|0>) = p Prob(|+>) = q Prob(|u>) = q 
Ψ0,0,1 Prob(|0>) = p Prob(|+>) = q Prob(|d>) = q 
Ψ0,1,0 Prob(|0>) = p Prob(|->) = q Prob(|u>) = q 
Ψ0,1,1 Prob(|0>) = p Prob(|->) = q Prob(|d>) = q 
Ψ1,0,0 Prob(|1>) = p Prob(|+>) = q Prob(|u>) = q 
Ψ1,0,1 Prob(|1>) = p Prob(|+>) = q Prob(|d>) = q 
Ψ1,1,0 Prob(|1>) = p Prob(|->) = q Prob(|u>) = q 
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Ψ1,1,1 Prob(|1>) = p Prob(|->) = q Prob(|d>) = q 
Table 1 – Summary of measurement results 
Where 
 p = a2  
 
q =
1
2
+
√2
2
√p(1 − p) 
(8) 
 
If p>0.5 than the probability of getting the correct answer is also Pcorrect> 0.5. Hence one 
can consider this scheme for each channel (“drawer”) also as a classical noisy channel.  
We can choose p such that q=p - achieving complete symmetry between all three 
channels (this is also probably also the optimal choice). This condition is fulfilled when 
 
p =
1
2
+
√12
12
 (9) 
 
In this case, the amount of information per channel can again be calculated using 
Shannon’s information formula: 
 I = 1 + p log2(p) + (1 − p) log2(1 − p) =  0.2559924488 
 
 (10) 
That is each channel contains approximately ¼ bit. The overall amount of information 
stored in all the tree channels is 3*I  0.76.  
Sending a sequence of N bits in each of the “drawers” can be achieved using 
N/0.39912396329 qubits in the two “drawers” case and N/0.2559924488 qubits in the 
three “drawers” case. 
Hence I have shown how to store two or three (fractional) bits in the same qubit. The 
receiver can retrieve either of them. Once a bit has been retrieved, the bits in the other 
“drawers” are not accessible. 
3 Applications 
In this part, I will describe two possible application for the above mechanism. The first 
application is a direct use of the “magic-box”. The second application is a new Quantum 
Key Distribution Protocol (QKD). The advantage of the new QKD protocol is that 
classical communication is required only in one direction. 
3.1 Application to Merchandize 
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Suppose that a distributor of a digital data wishes to distribute a set of two digital 
contents (like multi-video series or two books etc) to a customer. In addition - suppose 
that he wants to grant the customer a license to access only one of the two possible 
contents. One possible solution is to decrypt both contents with different keys. The 
receiver of the contents will be required to access the distributor in order to receive a 
key for any of the possible contents. Using the above mentioned CMB (Chinese Magic 
Box) – the sender may encode the content that she wishes on one of the channels (i.e. 
a sequence of Quantum CMB’s) and the second content on the other channel. An N-bits 
content requires N/0.3991qubits, due to the nosiness of the channel. The advantage is 
that the distributor is assured that the receiver will have access only to one of the 
contents. Once the receiver retrieved the content that he wishes – the other content is 
not available. 
Using the three compartment CMB one can achieve the same goal for three possible 
contents in a similar manner. Notice that the total overhead in qubits is only 25%. 
3.2 Application to Quantum Key Distribution 
 
In this section, I will describe a QKD protocol using CMB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Alice        BoB 
    Figure 1 - Asymmetric QKD Protocol 
Two sequence of 
random bits 
the two sets each in a different 
drawer (basis) 
con 
co 
Choose a set of random 
control-sequence 
Measure the CMB’s each 
in a different drawer 
Obtain the chosen 
key 
Send the chosen compartments (not 
the result of the measurements) 
Use the key to encrypt 
the message 
Decrypt the 
message using the 
shared key 
Encrypted message 
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Suppose that Alice sends a set of two-drawer Magic Boxes to Bob. Each drawer in 
every CMB is filled with a random bit. At this stage we will ignore the extra CMB’s 
needed due to the noisiness of the CMB’s. I will address this point in appendix A. Alice 
will register her CMB contents. Upon receiving the CMB’s Bob will choose another 
random sequence of 1’s and 0’s – the control sequence. If the bit in the control 
sequence is 0(1) he will read from drawer 1(2), respectively. Bob will then have a set of 
random bits read from the CMB’s –the key sequence. He will then use this key-
sequence of bits as a key to encrypt his message. In order to share his key with Alice, 
Bob will send his random control sequence openly to Alice. He can than send his 
encrypted message to Alice using open communication. Since Alice knows the content 
of her CMB’s she can reconstruct the encryption-key based on the open control-
sequence and thus she can decrypt the message from Bob. Since the control-sequence 
has no correlation to the key-sequence, nobody else can deduce the key-sequence 
other than Ellis. This process is shown in figure 1. 
Notice that the CMB’s sending can be done with significant time ahead of the classical 
communication. In this protocol there is only classical communication from Bob to Alice. 
Alice need not send or publish any classical communication. This is an advantage with 
respect to the BB84 protocol, where there is a need for classical communication from 
Alice to Bob as well as from Bob to Alice in order to negotiate on the agreed code. On 
the other hand, in the BB84 protocol, there is a need for 2 qubits on average for every 
single bit of code. In the CMB protocol there is a need for much more qubits per single 
code bit (see appendix A). 
 
4  Summary 
In this paper, I have shown how to construct a two or three drawers Quantum Chinese 
Magic Box. The property of the CMB is that one can open/read only one drawer. Once 
this drawer has been accessed, the content of the other drawers is not accessible. The 
CMB is constructed of a single qubit and it contains two or three “drawers” each with a 
fractional bit. This construction is based upon the wave function collapse and the no-
cloning theorem. 
I have described two possible applications for the CMB. The first is related to content 
distribution where the distributor can control the amount of received data without a need 
for post distribution communication. The second application is a new QKD distribution 
protocol where there is a need only for one directional classical communication. This 
can be very helpful when one side of the communication cannot send information but 
only receive it, for example when its location is not known or when it does not have 
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enough power for sending information. It may also require less time for the classical 
communication since only one direction communication is required. 
The following questions remain for future work – is it the most efficient CMB? Is there 
any advantage in using qudits as a basis for CMB? How does the CMB function when 
there is a quantum noise?  
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Appendix A 
In this appendix, I will describe a protocol for generating a shared sequence of K 
random bits between Alice and Bob, using CMB’s and taking into account the noisiness 
of the reading. The protocol will also involve steps that verify that the key was not 
compromised by an eve-dropper. 
Alice Preparation - Alice generates two random sequence of T bits (T  K). One can 
think of it as a sequence of T pairs of random bits. Alice keeps this sequence of T-pairs. 
In addition, Alice will prepare T blocks of R qubits. Each block will correspond to one 
pair. All the qubits in the same block will be identical and contain the first bit of the pair 
in the first “drawer” and the second bit in the second “drawer”. Alice will send the T*R 
qubits to Bob. 
Bob Preparation and Encryption – Bob generates a sequence of T random control 
bits. Each qubit in the same block is measured using the same basis. Different blocks 
can be measured using different basis. The value of the bit represented by the block is 
determined using the majority rule. 
Bob will randomly choose K blocks out of the T blocks. Bob will use the results of his 
measurements of these K blocks as his random-key. The results of all the T blocks will 
be used for eve-dropping detection (see later). 
If no eve-dropping was detected - Bob will share his choice of K-blocks together with his 
control bits for these blocks with Alice in an open channel. 
Bob will use his sequence of K bits as a key to encrypt his message and will send his 
encrypted message to Alice. 
Alice Decryption – Having receive the K-blocks id’s and the K control sequence from 
Bob, Alice can reconstruct the sequence of K bits that Bob uses as his encryption key. If 
there was no eve-dropping than only Alice can know what is the K-bits encryption key. 
She can decrypt the message from Bob using this key. 
CMB Noise and Choosing R - Clearly the larger the value of R is, the higher is the 
probability of Bob to retrieve the value that Alice used for constructing the CMB’s. For 
any 𝜖 > 0 one can find R such that the probability of Bob to retrieve correctly all the K-
bits is higher than 1 − 𝜖 
Eve Dropping and Eve Dropping Detection – Assume that there is an Eve with 
access to the T*R qubits between the time that Alice generated them and the time that 
Bob is using them. Since she does not know in advance the control sequence, she 
cannot measure them in the basis that Bob will measure them. However, due to the 
noisiness of the channel each block contains R>2 qubits. Eve may use this fact in order 
to measure two qubits in each block. The first qubit will be measured in the 
computational basis and the second in the {|+>,|->} basis. Since Bob measures each 
block in only one of the basis – Eve may have approximately  p= cos2
π
8
= 0.85355  
correlation with Bob’s result. In order to detect this occurrence of this scenario, Bob can 
check the distribution of the results in his blocks. If there was no eve-dropping the 
distribution is governed by the original states in the following way. 
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The measurement results of Bob will be denoted by 𝑀𝑖𝑗 where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑇 is the block 
number and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑅 is the index of the qubit in the block. Bob’s decision about each 
block will be denoted by 𝐵𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗(𝑀𝑖𝑗). Define 
𝐸 =
∑ (𝑀𝑖𝑗 − 𝐵𝑖)
2
𝑖,𝑗
𝑅 ∙ 𝑇
 
If there was no eve-dropping than < 𝐸 >= 𝑝 = 0.85355. However if Eve has measured 
two qubit per block then < 𝐸 >= 𝑝𝑒 = 0.8535 −
0.5
𝑅
 .  For any given R and for any 
𝜖 > 0 one can find 𝑇0 such that for any 𝑇 ≥ 𝑇0 the probability 𝑃[𝐸 < (𝑝 + 𝑝𝑒) 2⁄ ] is higher 
than 1 − 𝜖 in case when Eve chooses to measure two qubits in every block, each in a 
different basis. Using 𝑇 = 𝑇0 Bob can measure E and he can validate whether there was 
eve-dropping or not by measuring E. If 𝐸 < (𝑝 + 𝑝𝑒) 2⁄  he will deduce that there was an 
eve-dropping. 
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